In a path-breaking decision with far-reaching implications for the Indian judiciary, the Supreme Court Constitution Bench has held that judicial officers with a combined experience of seven years as an advocate and as a judicial officer are eligible to apply for direct recruitment to the post of District Judge. The five-judge bench, led by Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, and comprising Justices MM Sundresh, Aravind Kumar, S.C. Sharma, and K. Vinod Chandran, delivered the unanimous ruling today, setting aside the earlier decision in Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020).
The Court clarified that eligibility for appointment to the post of District Judge will be determined as on the date of the application, and not necessarily the date of appointment. In a significant policy direction, it also ordered that the minimum age for all candidates applying through the direct recruitment stream, including in-service judicial officers, shall be 35 years to maintain parity with advocates entering through the same channel.
Delivering the lead opinion, CJI Gavai emphasized that Article 233 of the Constitution must be interpreted purposively to promote judicial efficiency and inclusivity, rather than restrict opportunities for meritorious candidates within the judiciary. The Chief Justice noted that “for bringing advocates and in-service candidates at the same level, it will be appropriate that the rules provide that an in-service candidate should be eligible for direct recruitment as District Judge only if he has a combined experience of seven years as an advocate and a judicial officer.”
The Court categorically held that judicial officers who had completed seven years of Bar practice prior to joining the subordinate judiciary could not be denied the opportunity to compete for direct recruitment to the post of District Judge. The bench observed that “a person who has been or who is in judicial service and has a combined experience of seven years or more as an advocate or a judicial officer would be eligible for being considered and appointed as a District Judge or Additional District Judge under Article 233 of the Constitution.”
The ruling decisively overturns the restrictive interpretation adopted in Dheeraj Mor, where the Court had held that only practising advocates who were not in judicial service were eligible to apply for direct District Judge appointments under Article 233(2). By overruling that precedent, today’s judgment paves the way for a more inclusive and merit-based approach to higher judicial recruitment.
To ensure uniformity, the Court directed all State Governments and High Courts to amend their recruitment rules within three months in accordance with the ruling. The new rules must explicitly provide that in-service candidates will be eligible if they have a combined seven years of experience as a judicial officer and as an advocate.
The Constitution Bench also clarified that the judgment would apply prospectively, meaning ongoing or completed recruitment processes and appointments will not be disturbed. This ensures administrative stability while providing a progressive framework for future selections.
The Court’s ruling stemmed from the case of Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa & Ors., a civil appeal arising from a Kerala High Court judgment that had quashed Rejanish’s appointment as District Judge on the ground that he was serving as a Munsiff at the time of appointment and therefore ineligible under Article 233(2). The High Court had relied on Dheeraj Mor to hold that an advocate must continue in practice until appointment. However, the Supreme Court stayed that decision in 2021 and ultimately took up the issue for authoritative reconsideration before a Constitution Bench.
The bench examined the constitutional scheme in detail and the long line of precedents beginning from Satya Narain Singh to Dheeraj Mor. It held that the restrictive interpretation adopted earlier failed to reflect the true spirit of Article 233, which must be read as a whole rather than in isolation. The Court found that the phrase “a person not already in the service of the Union or of the State” in Article 233(2) cannot be understood literally to exclude judicial officers, especially those who have accumulated significant advocacy experience before joining service.
Justice Sundresh, in a concurring opinion, underscored the need for a purposive and pragmatic approach that aligns with the objective of selecting the most capable and experienced candidates for the higher judicial service. He observed that young and talented judicial officers who have demonstrated competence should not be deprived of the opportunity to rise through direct recruitment merely because they are already in service.
The Court also clarified that the seven years of experience must be continuous, rejecting the contention that fragmented or interrupted practice could qualify. The judgment explicitly stated that if a person has practised for a few years, taken a long break, and then resumed practice, such discontinuous experience would not meet the eligibility requirement. “There will be a disconnect with the legal profession,” the bench observed, stressing that continuous professional engagement is essential to maintain competence.
The bench further refused to create a 25% quota for practising advocates under Article 233(2), holding that the Constitution does not envisage any such classification. Instead, it placed advocates and in-service judicial officers on an equal footing by applying a common eligibility criterion. The judgment also emphasized that the selection process for District Judges should aim to attract the best talent, stating that “the object of any process of selection for entry into a public service should be to secure the most suitable person for the job.”
Importantly, the Court noted that Article 233(1) and 233(2) must be read harmoniously, as both sub-articles operate within the same constitutional framework governing judicial appointments. The Court stated that a “purposive interpretation” which advances efficiency, fairness, and merit must be preferred over a “pedantic” or “literal” one.
Legal experts have hailed the ruling as a transformative development that opens new avenues for judicial officers who have previously worked as advocates, thereby enhancing the pool of eligible candidates for higher judicial posts. The decision also reflects a larger shift toward merit-based inclusivity and balanced interpretation of constitutional provisions.
By overruling Dheeraj Mor and harmonizing the interpretation of Article 233, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the principle that judicial experience, like advocacy experience, is an equally valid and valuable qualification for higher judicial service. The ruling, described as one of the most consequential judicial reforms in recent years, marks a major step toward ensuring fairness and parity in judicial recruitment.
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