Citation : 2004 Local Law (CG) 28
The Chhattisgarh High Court has set aside a 2002 trial court order that had taken cognizance of offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act against two senior Hindustan Lever officials. In an order delivered by Justice L.C. Bhadoo, the High Court held that the complaint filed in the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s court did not make out a prima facie case against the company officers and that proceeding against them would amount to an abuse of the court’s process.
The dispute began with a consumer complaint lodged in 1999. The complainant, secretary of a registered consumer association in Kirandul, purchased a bathing bar labeled “Lifebuoy Plus” from a local wholesale co-operative store. The product was sealed and sent to the Government Drugs Examination Laboratory at Bhopal, which reported that the bathing bars were disbranded, an offence under Section 17C of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The complainant issued notices and reminders to the store and to Hindustan Lever Limited but received no response, and ultimately filed a criminal complaint against store managers and company officials.
When the Chief Judicial Magistrate recorded the complainant’s evidence, the court took cognizance of the offence and named two senior company officials, the Chairman and the Director (Personal Products), among the accused. The High Court, however, found that the complaint merely listed the petitioners as officers of the manufacturer without alleging that either was in charge of or responsible for the conduct of the company’s business in relation to the offending product.
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the High Court emphasized the narrow scope of vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. That provision attaches criminal liability to those who, at the time an offence is committed, were in charge of and responsible to the company for conducting its business. The court noted that mere designation as chairman or director does not establish those elements. Citing established authorities, the court held that without specific allegations or material to show that the officers were in charge of the relevant business, criminal proceedings cannot be sustained against them.
The High Court also rejected the state’s technical objection that the petitioners should have sought revision rather than approaching the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The court observed that its inherent jurisdiction may be invoked when an order causes abuse of process or would force an accused to undergo an unwarranted criminal trial. On that basis the court quashed the trial court’s order dated May 15, 2002, insofar as it related to the two company officers.
The court did not express a final view on whether bathing bars were, at the relevant time, properly classified as cosmetics. That factual or technical question was left open, because the petition succeeded on the narrower but dispositive point that the complaint did not properly allege the petitioners’ responsibility for the alleged offence.
This ruling is a reminder of the limited reach of vicarious liability in corporate prosecutions under regulatory statutes. It underscores the requirement that prosecuting authorities plead and, at the appropriate stage, prove facts showing an officer’s actual responsibility for the company’s operations before naming them in criminal proceedings.
Case Details : Misc. Cr. Case No. 495 of 2003, K.B. Dadiseth and Ors. vs. J.P. Memorial Centre and Ors. (06.08.2004)
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Surendra Singh, Sr. Adv. and Kishore Bhaduri, Adv. For the State: Alok Bakshi, Adv. for the Respondent No. 1 and J.D. Bajpayee, Govt. Adv. for the Respondent No. 2
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482; Constitution Of India – Article 227; Drugs And Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 17C, Drugs And Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 27A, Drugs And Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 34, Drugs And Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 34A(1)
Cases Referred:
State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal and Ors., AIR 1998 Supreme Court 2327; Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan, (1983) 1 SCC 1; Nalin Thakur and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 2004 (1) FAC 68; K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd., 2001 All MR (Cri.) 1206; Keki Bomi Dadiseth and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra, 2002 (1) FAC 294; Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors., 1998 Supreme Court 128; G. Sagar Suri and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 2000 Supreme Court 754
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अपराध – संज्ञान – वैधता – दण्ड प्रक्रिया संहिता, 1973 की धारा 482 तथा औषधि एवं प्रसाधन सामग्री अधिनियम, 1940 की धाराएँ 17C, 27A और 34 के तहत।
याचिकाकर्ता एक कॉस्मेटिक निर्माण कंपनी से जुड़े अधिकारी थे। कंपनी के विरुद्ध औषधि एवं प्रसाधन सामग्री अधिनियम, 1940 की धारा 17C सहपठित धारा 27A के अंतर्गत एक आपराधिक शिकायत दर्ज की गई थी, जिसमें याचिकाकर्ताओं को भी आरोपी बनाया गया था। मुख्य न्यायिक मजिस्ट्रेट (CJM) ने उक्त धाराओं के तहत याचिकाकर्ताओं के खिलाफ संज्ञान लिया। इसके विरुद्ध याचिकाकर्ताओं ने दण्ड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा 482 के तहत वर्तमान याचिका दायर की, जिसमें संज्ञान लेने की वैधता को चुनौती दी गई।
निर्णय: न्यायालय ने कहा कि अधिनियम, 1940 की धारा 34 के अनुसार यदि किसी कंपनी के विरुद्ध अपराध का मामला दर्ज किया गया है, तो केवल वही अधिकारी अभियोजित किए जा सकते हैं जो उस समय कंपनी के व्यवसाय के संचालन के लिए उत्तरदायी और प्रभारी थे।
वर्तमान मामले में शिकायत में याचिकाकर्ताओं के विरुद्ध केवल यह आरोप था कि वे कॉस्मेटिक वस्तुओं के निर्माता हैं। शिकायत में यह कहीं नहीं कहा गया था कि वे कंपनी के व्यवसाय के संचालन के लिए उत्तरदायी थे या कंपनी के कार्यों के प्रभारी थे। ऐसे में कोई ठोस साक्ष्य नहीं था जिससे यह सिद्ध हो सके कि याचिकाकर्ता कंपनी के व्यवसाय के संचालन के लिए जिम्मेदार थे।
अतः मुख्य न्यायिक मजिस्ट्रेट द्वारा याचिकाकर्ताओं के विरुद्ध धारा 17C सहपठित धारा 27A के अंतर्गत संज्ञान लेना त्रुटिपूर्ण था।
न्यायालय ने माना कि ऐसा आदेश न्यायिक प्रक्रिया का दुरुपयोग है, इसलिए याचिकाकर्ताओं के विरुद्ध आपराधिक कार्यवाही को निरस्त कर दिया गया।
परिणाम: याचिका स्वीकार की गई। याचिकाकर्ताओं के विरुद्ध संज्ञान आदेश को निरस्त किया गया।
